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Reverse Redlining in the 
Subprime Mortgage Market: 
Comments on Moving Toward 
Integration: The Past and 
Future of Fair Housing1 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield† 
My comments focus on the problem sometimes referred to as 
“reverse redlining,” which entails mortgage loans made to borrowers of 
color on terms significantly less favorable and more expensive than 
mortgage loans made to white borrowers. I will also try to unpack the 
chicken–egg problem of mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the 
African-American homeowner community. 
Let me start by saying that it is admirable that the authors seek to 
answer the question of why African-American borrowers received 
mortgage loans featuring higher interest rates and fees and more 
onerous terms, and why African-American borrowers experienced higher 
default and foreclosure rates during the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Without understanding why these things have occurred, it is harder to 
find public-policy solutions to these very real problems. 
The authors start by recognizing and accepting a multitude of 
studies concluding that African-American and Hispanic mortgage 
borrowers were much more likely to receive subprime and predatory 
mortgages during the subprime-market era (roughly from 1990 until 
2008) than white borrowers with similar credit profiles.2 The authors 
also recognize and accept studies finding that default and foreclosure 
rates were higher for African-American and Hispanic borrowers than 
for similarly situated white mortgage borrowers.3 In seeking to explain 
these truths, the authors then embark on a series of assumptions and 
conclusions that I will try to unpack here. 
The authors suggest that because African-American and Hispanic 
default rates were higher, providing these borrowers with loans priced 
 
1. Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: The 
Past and Future of Fair Housing (2018). 
†  Senior Instructor in Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. 
2. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 385–86. 
3. Id. at 386. 
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for this risk might not be discriminatory.4 This so-called paradox 
actually served as the justification for what lenders in the subprime 
market called risk-based pricing.5 The notion of risk-based pricing is 
that lenders can identify a borrower’s default risk based on the 
borrower’s credit history, and price the loan’s features (including 
interest rate and fees) accordingly to compensate for the lender’s risk. 
But this loan-pricing model ignores the fact that expensive loans create 
their own risk, and that there are numerous ways to structure a loan 
to a borrower with a particular credit profile—some of which will create 
a greater default risk than others. It also ignores the lender’s incentive 
to write a loan that will maximize its immediate profit regardless of 
default risk, especially since those to whom the loan is assigned after 
origination will bear the default risk. Finally, risk-based pricing ignores 
the combined effects of discretionary pricing and explicit or implicit 
bias. 
I would first like to debunk the notion that risk-based pricing 
matches scientifically determined loan terms with the borrower’s credit 
quality. There are numerous ways to write a loan for a borrower who 
“deserves” a particular interest rate. Some of these ways help a 
borrower to successfully pay back the loan, while others create their 
own risk of default. Take, for example, the case of Beatrice Troup. In 
1995, Ms. Troup, a then-seventy-four-year-old African American who 
had lived at the same home on Vanderpool Street in Newark, New 
Jersey for forty years, received a solicitation call from a home-repair 
contractor.6 She ultimately hired the contractor and entered into a 
mortgage loan, arranged by the contractor, for exterior home repairs.7 
Ms. Troup’s lenders required her to convey the home to herself and her 
son, Curtis. The lenders then issued the mortgage loan to both of the 
Troups.  The loan had a principal amount of  $46,500 which was to be 
repaid at an annual percentage rate of 11.65%.8 The loan required 
monthly payments of $462.50, and a final balloon payment after fifteen 
years of $41,603.58.9 Of the $46,500 lent to Ms. Troup and her son, the 
lender kept four points (4% of the amount loaned) as an origination 
 
4. Id. (“Thus we have another paradox: there is some strong evidence of 
discrimination against minority borrowers, but minority homeowners do 
pose higher risks of default.”). 
5. Id. at 383. 
6. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 535–36 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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fee.10 Within two years after the loan was made, Ms. Troup stopped 
making payments on the loan, and the loan’s holder, Associates Home 
Equity Services, filed for judicial foreclosure.11 Ms. Troup’s attorneys 
responded with claims for reverse redlining and predatory lending.12 
The case itself had complex facts and odious conduct by several 
actors, and presented the court with numerous legal issues. But I want 
to focus here on two challenges to the notion that the lender priced this 
loan to reflect Ms. Troup’s and her son’s default risk. First, if we assume 
that the 11.65% interest rate was somehow justified because the Troups 
had a high default risk, this cannot be the end of our discussion. There 
are numerous ways to write a high-interest loan like this. Here, the 
lender chose to write it as a balloon loan. As Table 1 illustrates, that 
structure increased the loan’s total repayment amount from $98,577 to 
$124,391.08. The only benefit to the Troups of writing the loan as a 
balloon loan was a slightly lower monthly payment of $462.50 
(compared to $547.65 under a non-balloon structure). By writing the 
loan as a balloon loan, the lender may have slightly decreased the 
Troup’s default risk in a given month (depending, of course, on their 
combined monthly income and debt-to-income ratio), but the lender 
also greatly increased the Troups’ default risk—and also the risk they 
would lose their home—when the balloon payment came due—all while 
increasing the lender’s own take from making the loan. Thus, even if 
the Troups somehow “deserved” an expensive loan, the lender could 
have written the loan in a way to decrease its risk and increase the 
chances of successful repayment. 
Second, it is abundantly clear that many subprime loans to African-
American borrowers were priced unjustifiably high, creating their own 
default risk. For example, in the Troup case it appears from evidence 
given in the lawsuit that the Troups were not a bad credit risk.13 
Although the court did not explicitly disclose the Troups’ incomes or 
credit scores, Ms. Troup’s attorneys offered expert testimony that the 
Troups had a “favorable” debt-to-income ratio and favorable credit 
histories.14 This suggests that the lender, if actually pricing for risk, 
should have given the Troups a loan priced at a conventional rate. As 
Table 1 demonstrates, a loan priced this way would have created a 
significantly lower default risk. A loan for $46,500 made at the 
 
10. Id.  This is a large origination fee. 
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
13. Id. at 544. 
14. Id. at 538. Curtis Troup’s credit history showed only one charge-off of $75 
and an outstanding debt to the DMV of $250. Beatrice Troup had no 
negative information on her credit report. Id. at 544. 
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conventionally available rate of 6.6% would have required a monthly 
payment of only $407.63 if written as a 15-year loan, and a mere $296.98 
if written as a 30-year loan. Its total repayment amount would have 
been lower, and there would have been no balloon payment. By writing 
a loan at a high, and likely unjustified, rate, the lender and the loan 
itself created a higher default risk. That this unjustifiably expensive 
loan, and others like it, ultimately ended in default cannot serve as 
justification for the loan’s exorbitant pricing.15 
 









Actual loan from 
the case - Fixed 
11.65% 15-year 
balloon $46,500.00 $77,891.08 $124,391.08 $462.50 $41,603.58 
11.65% 15-year, no 
balloon $46,500.00  $52,077.00 $98,577.00 $547.65 $ - 
11.65%, 30 years $46,500.00 $121,193.30 $167,693.30 $465.81  
6.6%, 15 years $46,500.00 $26,873.40 $73,373.40 $407.63 $ - 
6.6%, 30 years $46,500.00 $60,412.80 $106,912.80 $296.98 $ - 
 
Why would a lender make a loan that increases its own default 
risk? It is because, as the book’s authors recognize, lenders made a large 
portion of their expected income from a loan at the loan’s inception. 
They then passed the default risk on to others by transferring the loan.16 
And, until 2008, when housing-market values crashed and the property 
market became saturated with unsold, foreclosed properties, a lender 
who foreclosed on a property was almost guaranteed to make a profit 
reselling that property.17 
 
15. It should also be noted here that subprime-era home repair contractors 
were notorious for making home repair loans and then not actually doing 
the work. See Tania Davenport, Note, An American Nightmare: 
Predatory Lending in the Subprime Home Mortgage Industry, 36 Suffolk 
U. L. Rev. 531, 543 (2003) (describing contractors’ practice of issuing a 
loan for “excessively expensive, unnecessary, or shoddy or incomplete 
home repairs”). This is, of course, another way that risk of default is 
increased by the transaction itself, not the borrower. 
16. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 380 (“Disintermediation also directly 
fostered the rise of mortgage companies that were not banks at all, but 
simply vehicles for finding, packaging, and selling mortgages on the open 
market.”).  
17. See id. at 381 (describing the mortgage lender’s “loosened underwriting 
standards” based on “the theory that no loan could really go ‘bad’ if the 
underlying security (the house) continued to rapidly appreciate.”).  
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Another fallacy of the risk-based pricing model is that the price 
borrowers paid in the subprime market reflected the lender’s risk 
assessment. In fact, in the subprime market, risk-based pricing models 
might have been used to categorize borrowers, but those making the 
loan-term decisions were authorized, and incentivized, to charge more 
than the price the borrower’s risk supposedly justified.18 This would 
work as follows. Most lenders would maintain a risk matrix. Under the 
risk matrix, factors such as the borrower’s credit score, payment 
history, debt-to-income ratio, and history of bankruptcies, among other 
things, would be placed on a pricing matrix, and borrowers would be 
slated for a particular interest rate and fees based on where the 
borrower fell on the risk matrix.19 But this exercise did not set the 
borrower’s final pricing. Rather, the risk matrix’s rates and fees served 
as a pricing floor, and first-line lenders (either mortgage brokers making 
loans on behalf of lenders, or first lenders making the loan with the 
intent to sell to a particular lender who set the risk matrix) were 
permitted to write the actual loan at a higher rate or with more fees.20 
A first-line mortgage lender who engaged in this discretionary pricing 
was generously rewarded, as it received a share of the increased income 
derived from writing the loan at a higher rate or with higher fees.21  
The Troups’ case is illustrative. East Coast Mortgage Corporation 
was the Troups’ first-line lender. But Associates Home Equity Services 
was the party intended to be the lender all along. East Coast Mortgage 
charged the Troups a higher interest rate than the already-inflated rate 
Associates would have approved for the Troups—and in exchange, 
Associates paid East Coast a premium of $2325.22 Without question, 
lenders employed these discretionary pricing schemes more regularly 
and at higher prices against borrowers of color, resulting in higher 
pricing for such borrowers.23 The use of discretionary up-charging for 
borrowers of color might have been the result of outright or implicit 
bias, but it was clearly not tied to the borrower’s default risk. Indeed, 
these more expensive loans created their own default risk. 
The authors attempt to explain the disproportionate number of 
subprime loans made to African-American borrowers by suggesting that 
 
18. Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to 
Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 677, 690 (2009). 
19. Id. at 689.  
20. Id. at 690.   
21. Id.  
22. Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 534, 538 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
23. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see White, supra note 18, 
at 690–91. 
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African-American borrowers may have received these loans because 
they did not have “the type of credit history that Anglos typically 
have.”24 Further, they suggest that African-American borrowers might 
have sought out these loans because African-American households are 
typically unconnected to conventional financial institutions. Finally, 
the authors suggest that the community of African-American borrowers 
consisted of relatively “naïve” borrowers, unaccustomed to conventional 
banks and lenders, and thus more likely to be susceptible to outreach 
by unscrupulous lenders.25 
I agree that it would be a very useful exercise to examine the loan 
and lender choices presented to, and chosen by, borrowers of color, in 
order to determine if lack of either choice or sophistication resulted in 
the higher rate of subprime loans to African-American households. But, 
for several reasons I think it is important to reach conclusions about 
this only after careful study. 
First, while it is possible that African Americans are more likely to 
use alternative, rather than bank-based financial services, the authors 
cite no data to support this claim.  They also present no data suggesting 
that African Americans who use alternative financial-service providers 
are the same African Americans who are homeowners. Second, we know 
that much of the subprime market entailed re-finance loans made to 
borrowers—many of whom had conventional mortgage loans from 
banking institutions—which were then re-financed into subprime loans. 
I am aware of no study that has looked at the question of how many 
African-American borrowers refinanced their conventional, bank-issued 
mortgage loans into subprime loans. It would seem that answering this 
question is crucial to concluding that borrowers of color could not, or 
would not, approach conventional lenders for a mortgage loan. 
I am currently in the process of writing a book that looks at 
mortgage lending on a single block in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, 
including during the subprime market.26 On that block alone, there are 
instances where a borrower maintained a high-quality, conventional, 
bank-based mortgage for a long time, then took a series of subprime 
mortgage loans that resulted in the borrower losing the home.27 In some 
of those cases, the borrower is likely to have been African American, 
although matching a particular borrower at a particular address with 
 
24.    Sander et al., supra note 1, at 387.  
25. Id. at 386–87. 
26. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, On Our Block (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).  The block consists of 40 homes sitting back to back on 
Cedarbrook and Kildare west of Goodnor. 
27. This story’s facts and the subsequent analysis rely on Cuyahoga County 
files related to parcel number 687-06-051. Disclosing the borrowers’ names 
and addresses would compromise their privacy, and are therefore omitted. 
Please contact the author for verifying details.  
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that borrower’s race often involves an educated guess based on press 
and other searches. For example, a couple that was likely African 
American purchased a home on my block in September 1980 with a 
mortgage from Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corporation, a non-
bank lender incorporated in Delaware. In June 1985, the loan was 
assigned to a federal savings and loan. Whether this assignment was 
the borrowers first interaction with a banking institution is unknown 
but, regardless, the borrowers took a second mortgage from Society 
National Bank in April 1988. Thus, by 1988 they were aware of and 
able to interface with a locally based, national bank. The borrowers 
retired this second mortgage three years early and, in May 1991, they 
refinanced their purchase-money loan through Society National Bank. 
Thus, as of May 1991, they had only one mortgage loan on their home 
and it was from a national bank. They took another second mortgage 
from Society National Bank in June 1992, a home equity line of credit 
from Huntington National Bank in August 1995, and another second 
mortgage from Society National Bank in March 1997. Clearly, these 
borrowers were accustomed to dealing with bank lenders. 
In November 1998, eighteen years after purchasing their home, 
these borrowers refinanced their existing first and second mortgages—
both of which had come from a bank—with an $82,000 mortgage from 
Equifinancial, LP, a subprime mortgage lender. At the time, the original 
principal on their existing mortgages was $75,000 (consisting of a first 
mortgage Society National Bank made in 1991 for $45,000, and a second 
mortgage, also from Society National Bank, made in 1997 for just over 
$30,000). By the time this subprime refinance loan was made, the 
borrowers surely would have owed less money on both their first and 
second mortgages. The increased principal of this subprime mortgage 
may have been due to an increased value of the property, although the 
county auditor valued the property for tax purposes that year at only 
$66,400. The increased principal might also have been justified by an 
inflated appraisal – a practice prevalent in the subprime market that 
would have trapped the borrowers into the loan since neither refinance 
nor resale would enable them to pay off the mortgage. 
The refinance loan bore an onerous initial interest rate of 9.5%, 
compared to the going rate for 30-year conventional mortgages of 
6.87%.28 After the first two years, the interest rate on this loan would 
jump to a rate based on the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
plus 6.48%. In November 2000, the LIBOR was 5.13%, so the new rate 
on this loan starting in November 2000 would have been 11.61% - made 
 
28. 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate (DISCONTINUED) (MORTG), 
Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis: Econ. Res., http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
 fred2/series/MORTG/ [https://perma.cc/BG2K-DVUP] (last updated 
Oct. 3, 2016). 
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up of the base rate of 6.48% plus the LIBOR rate of 5.13%.29 It is not 
possible to determine the borrowers’ interest rates on their refinanced 
loans because interest rates are generally reflected in the mortgage note, 
which is not filed with the county recorder’s office when a security 
interest is taken on a mortgage loan. But if the borrowers’ existing 
mortgages reflected the market rate when made, the first mortgage 
would have born a rate of about 9%, and the second mortgage would 
have had a rate of about 8%.30 Thus, the borrowers’ initial interest rate 
on their subprime refinance loan would have been only slightly higher 
than the rate on their existing loan. But their rate after the first two 
years would be significantly higher. Had the borrowers refinanced with 
a conventional loan they likely would have had a rate of 6.87%,31 and 
the rate would not have re-set at the end of two years. The true question 
here is why any borrower would make this loan choice.  
In these borrowers’ case, at least, it is clear that unfamiliarity with 
conventional banking institutions was not a factor.  
 
 
By taking the subprime loan from Equifinancial, LP, these 
borrowers embarked on a downward spiral that led, ultimately, to 
foreclosure.  In December 2001, after their loan had reset to the much 
higher interest rate, they took another subprime loan – this time from 
a lender called Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. This loan increased 
the principal from $82,000 to $89.500. The interest rate on this loan is 
not available in public records. Less than a year later, in October 2002, 
the borrowers refinanced again with Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. 
This loan was for a huge new principal of $117,500. Again, we cannot 
tell what the interest was on this loan. One thing that is certain is that 
by making a second large loan to these borrowers in one year, Primary 
Residential Mortgage, Inc. was able to receive two large sums of money 
in points and fees rather than one, since these are assessed and paid 
when the loan is closed. 
By June 2005, the borrowers were behind on their taxes by two 
years, and a tax lien for $13,604.57 was placed on their property—not 
very much money in the context of an outstanding mortgage for 
$117,500. The borrowers refinanced again with a new subprime lender 
in November 2005, fell behind on their taxes again in 2005 and 2006, 
 
29. LIBOR Rates—30-Year Historical Chart, Macrotrends, https://www 
 .macrotrends.net/1433/historical-libor-rates-chart [https://perma.cc/ 
 MCK9-UJXT] (last visited May 24, 2020). 
30. See 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate (DISCONTINUED) (MORTG), 
supra note 28. 
31. National Monthly Average Mortgage Rates, Mortgage-X Mortgage Info. 
Serv., http://mortgage-x.com/general/national_monthly_average.asp?y= 
 1998 [https://perma.cc/A6DN-6ZXB] (last visited May 24, 2020). 
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and ultimately lost their home in a default foreclosure judgment in 
January 2015. 
Why did these borrowers opt to take a series of dangerous and 
expensive subprime mortgages? Clearly, they had exposure to 
conventional banks. Were they in financial trouble when they chose to 
go with a subprime lender? Did they have compromised credit histories 
when this choice was made? Did they understand what they were 
getting themselves into? Did they understand what it meant to pay an 
interest rate based on LIBOR? Why were these homeowners able to 
engage in successful and sustainable home ownership for the first 
eighteen years they owned this house, only to fall behind and lose the 
home in a foreclosure action in which they did not even fight the lender? 
All of these questions would have to be answered to understand both 
the subprime market and the racial aspects of that market. The 
behavior of the borrowers discussed above—taking a series of 
devastating subprime loans after eighteen years of successful home 
ownership—did not occur due to an incomplete credit history or lack of 
exposure to conventional banking institutions, as evidenced by their 
loan history with conventional, Cleveland lenders. Something else must 
have been going on. The research challenge is to figure out what. 
The authors fail to recognize that the subprime market was, itself, 
a discriminatory system in which borrowers of color were the victims.32 
At first, the authors appear to be saying that African-American 
borrower characteristics were likely to cause them to default at higher 
rates than their white counterparts, and that this, in turn, led 
conventional lenders to “indulge in some level of statistical 
discrimination against black applicants.”33 These factors cited by the 
authors, but backed up by no data, include a higher likelihood of 
unemployment and under-employment; fewer resources to draw upon 
in case of default; lack of comfort with conventional lenders; more 
propensity to deal with payday and other alternative financial-services 
providers; and a reluctance to seek assistance from an existing lender.34 
The authors then seem to suggest that conventional lenders did not 
discriminate against African-American mortgage borrowers. Rather, 
they suggest, heavy subprime lending to African-American borrowers 
took place because these borrowers themselves were more comfortable 
with and more likely to rely on unconventional lenders35—the very 
 
32. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 387–88.  
33. Id. at 388. 
34. Id. at 387–88. 
35. Id. at 388. 
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lenders who offered less favorable mortgage terms. The authors then 
conclude that this demonstrates a lack of reverse redlining.36 
The very fact that African-American and white borrowers with 
similar credit profiles received different loans during the subprime era, 
and that African-American borrowers demonstrably and regularly 
received the ones with unfavorable terms, is reverse redlining. Whether 
those borrowers were turned away by conventional lenders, sent to 
subprime subsidiaries by those conventional lenders, or received 
unjustifiably expensive loans from non-traditional lenders, one thing is 
clear: these borrowers were experiencing discrimination. Thus, the 
authors’ conclusion that there was no reverse redlining because 
conventional lenders only marginally discriminated against African-
American borrowers, and African-American borrowers preferred non-
traditional lenders, does not, after all, reconcile the competing 
narratives of the mortgage crisis. It may be impossible to know why 
some borrowers took dangerously expensive and unfavorable loans from 
subprime lenders, but we cannot merely assume why they did so and 
then base policy on those assumptions. Nor can we assume that 
borrowers’ choices and risk profiles explain away the pricing 
discrepancies that worked so severely against African-American 
homeowners during the subprime market era. To do so is to blame the 
victims of reverse redlining for the bad loans and high default rates they 




36. For example, the authors write that they observed “a higher reliance on 
unconventional lenders in heavily minority neighborhoods, even in the 
absence of redlining.” Id. They then conclude by saying, “blacks were 
much less likely to encounter discriminatory treatment when dealing with 
mainstream lenders, but . . . the market is sufficiently segmented so that 
blacks were getting a disproportionate share of their mortgages from out-
of-mainstream lenders extending mortgages on much less favorable 
terms.” Id. 
